Abstract: Suppose that we have access to a finite set of expenditure data drawn from an individual consumer, i.e., how much of each good has been purchased and at what prices. Afriat (1967) was the first to establish necessary and sufficient conditions on such a data set for rationalizability by utility maximization. In this note, we provide a new and simple proof of Afriat's Theorem, the explicit steps of which help to more deeply understand the driving force behind one of the more curious features of the result itself, namely that a concave rationalization is without loss of generality in a classical finite data setting. Our proof stresses the importance of the non-uniqueness of a utility representation along with the finiteness of the data set in ensuring the existence of a concave utility function that rationalizes the data.
more curious features of the result itself, namely that a concave rationalization is without loss of generality in a classical finite data setting.
Formally, let D = (p t , x t ) t∈T be a finite data set, where x t = (x t 1 , x t 2 , . . . , x t ) ≥ 0 denotes the consumption of goods purchased at prices p t = (p t 1 , p t 2 , . . . , p t ) 0. The data set D = (p t , x t ) t∈T is said to be rationalizable if there exists a preference relation * on R + , which is complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated, such that, at every observation t ∈ T , x t * x for any x ∈ B t := {x ∈ R + : p t · x ≤ p t · x t }. In words, a data set is rationalizable if we are unable to reject the hypothesis that a consumer has consistently chosen a preferred option from the set of feasible alternatives. It is worth stressing that we require the consumer's preference to be stable, i.e., unchanging across observations.
Theorem 1 (Afriat's Theorem). The following statements are equivalent:
(3) There exists a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function v : R + → R, such that, at every observation t ∈ T , x t ∈ arg max x∈B t v(x).
For seminal statements and proofs of Afriat's Theorem, see Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982) ; for the relationship between our approach and the broader literature, we refer the reader to the discussion which immediately follows the proof. Before formally proving Theorem 1, we emphasize a number of distinctive features of our approach. Firstly, and most importantly, our proof (in its construction) stresses the importance of the nonuniqueness of a utility representation along with the finiteness of the data set in ensuring the existence of a concave utility function that rationalizes the data. Secondly, like Varian's (1982) algorithmic proof, ours is entirely constructive; however, unlike Varian (1982) , we first construct the numbers (vmost renditions of Afriat's Theorem typically incorporate a further equivalent statement, namely that the data set obeys an intuitive no-cycling condition known as the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP); 1 we omit this statement of the theorem as our proof does not appeal to GARP.
We first prove that (1) =⇒ (2), i.e., the necessity of the Afriat inequalities for rationalizability by a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation, in three distinct lemmas. Throughout, let X := {x t : t ∈ T } denote the finite set of observed consumption bundles. By convention, the infimum (resp., supremum) of the empty set is +∞ (resp., −∞), r/0 = +∞ for any r > 0, and R := R ∪ {−∞, +∞} is the extended real line. if v rationalizes the data but fails condition (iii), then any affine transformation αv + β, with (α, β) ∈ R ++ × R, would also violate condition (iii) since the ratios remain unchanged, i.e.,
for any (x t , x t , x t ). For instance, in the domain of risk, the expected utility representation is unique (up to an affine transformation), 3 and concavity of the Bernoulli function is not without loss of generality, as demonstrated by Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2015) . (See also the examples under uncertainty in Bayer et al. (2013) and Echenique and Saito (2015) .)
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the preference relation is complete and transitive, there exists
t for all (t, t ) ∈ T i × T j with i > j, and
e., we can partition the set of observations into equivalence classes, ordered from the worst to the best. By the finiteness of X , a representation (v t ) t∈T of exists. Since there is nothing to prove if
For all t ∈ T , define the sets
.
can be viewed as a half-open
interval on the extended real line R.
Clearly, (v t ) t∈T is a representation of . We now argue that (v t ) t∈T is also a representation of which satisfies condition (iii). Choose any triplet (t , t, t ) ∈ T × T × T satisfying
By uniqueness up to an affine transformation, we mean uniqueness within the class of expected utility representations.
where the inequalities follow from the fact that we are summing over positive terms and
Finally, by construction, we have that
, which completes the argument.
We now apply Lemmas 1 and 2 in order to construct multipliers, thereby completing the proof that the Afriat inequalities are a necessary condition for rationalizability by a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation.
Lemma 3. Given the data set D = (p t , x Suppose that a consumer is observed to have chosen the bundle x 1 = (4, 1) at the prices p 1 = (1, 2), x 2 = (2, 2) at p 2 = (2, 2), and x 3 = (2, 1) at p 3 = (2, 1). This scenario is depicted in Figure 1 .
Suppose that a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation * rationalizes the data, with
Lemma 1 is satisfied, with the restriction of * to X × X . Turning to Lemma 2, we have T 0 = {3}, T 1 = {2}, and T 2 = {1}; U 1 = ∅, U 2 = {1}, and U 3 = {1, 2};
Letting m * = m 2 = 1, the numbers v 3 = 0, v 2 = 1/2, and v 1 = 3/4 satisfy Lemma 2. As a final step, we prove that (2) =⇒ (3), i.e., the sufficiency of the Afriat inequalities for rationalizability by a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function.
Lemma 4. If there exists (v t , λ
Since rationalization by a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function clearly implies rationalization by a complete, transitive, and locally non-satiated preference relation, we have shown an equivalence between (1), (2), and (3), and the proof of Afriat's Theorem is therefore complete.
Some background and concluding remarks are helpful to situate the main insights of our approach. Afriat's Theorem was initially stated and proven by Afriat (1967) using a combinatorial inductive approach. Several years later, the result was simplified, qualified,
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Suppose the consumer had chosenx It first appears in Afriat (1967) , then Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) , among many others.
and extended by Diewert (1973) , who related the theorem more directly to a specific linear programming problem, and by Varian (1982) , who more explicitly linked GARP to the cyclical consistency property of Afriat (1967) , and who generally promoted the broad approach as a nonparametric alternative to demand analysis. More recently, Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004) provided two new proofs of Afriat's Theorem, one inductive and another exploiting the dual structure inherent in linear programming problems.
Several extensions and adaptations to the Afriat (1967) approach have proven insightful and useful over the years. Matzkin (1991) , Chavas and Cox (1993) , Minelli (2009), and Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2014) provided complete characterizations under more general (not necessarily linear) constraints. Teo and Vohra (2003) showed that rationalizability is related to the identification of cycles in graphs, and Geanakoplos (2013) linked rationalizability to the existence of equilibria in zero-sum games. Reny (2015) circumvented the Afriat inequalities entirely and directly proved that GARP is necessary and sufficient for rationalizability (in both finite and infinite data), somewhat in the spirit of Rochet (1987) and Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) . Lastly, Fujishige and Yang (2012) , Polisson and Quah (2013) , Cosaert and Demuynck (2014) , and Forges and Iehlé (2014) allowed for discreteness and indivisibilities, which is a natural consideration in many empirical applications.
Our approach delivers further clarity on a particular issue, namely that a concave rationalization is without loss of generality in a finite data setting. Firstly, let us say that a preference relation on X is consistent with the data if it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii).
Lemma 2 then states that any preference relation on X , consistent with the data, admits a specific representation, i.e., a representation that satisfies condition (iii). In turn, Lemma 3
states that this specific representation admits multipliers, which satisfy the Afriat inequalities, and which therefore extends to a concave representation on the entire consumption space. This observation complements a recent result of Quah (2014) , who stated that any preference relation on X , consistent with the data, extends to a concave rationalization on the entire consumption space; in this note, we have explicitly constructed a specific representation on X , which extends to a concave representation on the entire consumption space.
One advantage of proving the necessity of the Afriat inequalities directly (and without appealing to GARP) is to highlight the role of non-uniqueness (up to affine transformations), and therefore the main insight of the approach can be found in Lemma 2. As Diewert (1973) concluded, "it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the [utility function] constructed from a finite body of price and quantity data . . . is continuous, increasing and concave when the decision-maker's 'true ' [preference] only satisfies the much weaker regularity conditions . . .
thus the data will never be able to reveal backward bending indifference curves or nonconvex indifference sets." Diewert (1973) goes on to quote Samuelson (1950) , who made the earlier observation that "any point where the indifference curves are convex rather than concave cannot be observed in a competitive market," and that "such points are shrouded in eternal darkness." What this note has highlighted is that the lack of uniqueness of a utility representation in a restricted finite data setting is largely responsible for such an equivalence.
When budgets are nonlinear, however, a lack of uniqueness (say, up to affine transformations) of the representation does not necessarily guarantee the equivalence. Indeed, we also require the ratios of utilities (v
